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RECENT CASES

RECENT CASES
TORTS-WILLFUL TORTS OF EMPLOYEESEMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-EXTENSION OF
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
It was once held that a master was not liable for the unauthorized willful torts of his servant,' but the development of
vicarious liability principles led the courts to say that a command could be "implied" from the employment2 and the
liability thus imputed to the master.
Nevertheless, it is usually held that one who acts entirely
for his benefit or from personal motive, is outside the scope of
his employment a , but a further development of the respondeat
superior doctrine has resulted in a well-settled rule which
holds the master liable for seemingly personal torts if the court
can find a reasonable connection with the employee's work.
This is based on a finding that there was a furtherance of the
master's business or his interests, or from an impulse or emotion
arising from the employment or in some way incident thereto. 4
In Ochsrider v. Reading Co.,5 Randazzo, an employee of
defendant railroad, who had a reputation for fault finding and

1 Wigmore, Responsibility

for Tortious Acts: It's History, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315,
383, 441 (1894); Baty, Vicarious Liability, ch. 1 (1916); Wright v. Wilcox, 19
Wend. 343 (N. Y. 1838).
2 Baty, Vicarious Liability, 81, 107 (1916), supra, note 1; 1 Bl. Comm. 429, 456'
457; Person, Basis for Master's Liability to Third Persons, 4Vand .L. Rev. 260
(1951); Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior", Harvard Legal
Essays 433, 451 (1934).
3 2 Mechem, Agency (2d ed.), sec. 1929, 1960 (1914); Retatement (Second)'
Agency sec. 228 et. seq. (1958); Panama R. Co. v. Bosse 249 U. S. 41 (1919);
Baskett v. Banks, 186 Va. 1022, 45 S. E. 2d 173 (1947); Bradley v. Stevens, 329
Mich. 556, 46 N. W. 2d 382, 34 A.L.R. 2d 367 (1951); 3 CJ.S., Agency
sec. 255. It is said that if one acts partly for his benefit, and partly for the
master's, the act falls within the scope of employment. Rest., Agency 2d.'
sec. 461.
4 Horton v. Jones, 208 Miss. 257, 44 So. 2d 397, 15 A. L. R. 2d 824 (1950); 3
Cooley, Torts (4th ed. 1932) sec. 393; 1 Rest., Agency 2d sec. 214, 228; 45
Harv. L. Rev. 342 (1931). Cases which have refused to extend the liability:
Bradlow v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 131 Conn. 192, 38 A2d 679 (1944); Mandel v. Byram, 191 Wis. 446, 211 N. W. 145 (1926); Atlanta Baseball Co. v.
Lawrence, 38 Ga. 497, 144 S. E. 351 (1928); Valley v. Clay, 151 La. 710, 92
So. 308 (1922).
SOchsrider v. Reading Co., 172 F. Supp. 830 (E. D. Penn. 1959).
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was known as a quick-tempered, chronic complainer, suddenly
left his work station asserting that plaintiff's crew was too slow
in passing on work to him. Plaintiff tried to placate him, and
without further provocation, Randazzo violentlyandpersistently
attacked the plaintiff causing serious personal injuries. The
Court found, when an action was brought against defendant
railroad on vicarious liability principles, 6 that the act was
not committed within the scope of employment nor with a
view to furthering the defendant's business. The court felt
that it could not infer that Randazzo, in the commission of the
act, was inspired by any desire to "speed up" the operations in
defendant's interests. The seriousness of the injuries suggested
an attack arising from personal motive,7 i.e. to express resentment and gratify a vindictive temper.
Under the theory of some Virginia cases the court might
have arrived at a different conclusion:
In Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh,8 defendant bus company
employed Mooney as a driver. While operating a bus in the
usual manner, Mooney attempted to make a turn, the completion of which threatened to damage the plaintiff's car properly
stopped beside the bus. Without completing the turn, Mooney
stopped the bus, alighted, and engaged in an altercation with
plaintiff leading to an attack by Mooney upon the plaintiff.
The plaintiff brought an action against the bus company.
The court held that, although the tort was intentional and
willful, the jury was justified in concluding that the result was
an impulse or emotion which had arisen directly out of the
6 The action was brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act which provides that a railroad engaged in interstate commerce "...
shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce.., for such injury.., resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier ...
45 U.S.C.A. sec. 51.
The statute has so been construed that negligence may embrace assault and
battery, and the general principles of vicarious liability are applied. Steeley v.
Kurn, 313 U. S. 545 (1940); Nelson v. American-West African Line, Inc., 86
F2d 730 (2 Cir. 1936), cert. den. 300 U. S. 665 (1937); Gibson v. Kennedy, 23
N.J. 150, 128 A2d 480 (1957).
7 Citing Rest., Agency Sec. 235, comment c.

8 198 Va. 299, 49 S.E. 2d 363 (1948); 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1028 (1949); cf Annot., 53
A.L.R. 2d 720 (1957), (Assault by taxicab or motorbus driver); Annot., 172
A.L.R. 532 (1948), (Assault by truck driver or chauffeur).
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prosecution of the master's business and within the course of
employment.
At page 305, the court said: ... Anger, malice, vindictiveness,-frailties of human nature,-are among the risks imposed
upon the master in the employment of his servant. When
these emotions are indulged in by the servant, even to the
extent of committing a willful tort, if the ultimate purpose
to be thereby attained is in the furtherance of the servant's
duties and in the execution of the master's business entrusted
to him, the master is liable for the resultant damage.. ."9
In Cary v. Hotel Rueger, Inc. 1o, a bellboy employed by defendant hotel corporation shot and killed plaintiff's decedent
in an elevator operated by the bellboy in defendant's hotel. It
was held that the trial court properly struck the plaintiff's
evidence, saying that the shooting resulted from an argument as
to whether the employee owed the deceased money, and thus
arose out of personal motive on the employee's part, the elevator being the mere chance location of the shooting. The court
cited the Tri-State Case as controlling and quoted therefrom,
supplying its own italics:
"Had the turn been wholly negotiated into State Street, thus
avoiding the real or apparent danger of collision, and Mooney
had then abandoned the business of his master and committed the
tort solely to gratify personal feelings and not to accomplish or
effect his insistence upon his right of movement, it would not
have been within the scope of his employment; but here it was
committed in the very act of negotiatingthe turn." 11
The above cases were decided pursuant to the principles
enunciated in the Davis v. Merrell,2 case. There the court
9 Citing: 35 Am.Jur. Master and Servant, sec. 560; 3 CJ.S. Agency, sec. 255, 258;
Rest., Agency, sec. 245; Field v. Sanders, 29 Cal. 2d 834, 180 P. 2d 684, 172
A.L.R. 525 (1947).
Cases holding contra tri-state: Plotdin v. Northland Transp. Co., 204
Minn. 422, 283 N. W. 758 (1939), 23 Minn. L. Rev. 981 (1939); Georgia
Power Co., v. Shipp, 195 Ga. 446, 24 S. E. 2d 764 (1943); Wood v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 302 Ky. 110, 194 S. W. 2d 81 (1946); cf. Limpus v.
London General Omnibus Co., 1 H. & C. 526, 158 Eng. Rep. 993 (1862).
(Leading case).
10 195 Va. 980, 81 S. E. 2d421 (1954).
11 Id., at 985, quoting from 188 Va. at 305.
12 133 Va. 69, 112 S. E. 628 (1922).
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properly refused an instruction which would have required the
jury to find for defendant if they were of the opinion that the
agent's act was not required or authorized by the defendant
railroad where the watchman at a train crossing shot and killed
plaintiff's decedent after an argument regarding the raising of
the gates. The defendant railroad, being the employer of
the watchman, was held liable.
In Cary v. Hotel Rueger1 3, the court compared the Tri-State
and Davis Cases saying that in the former the argument arose
out of the operation of a bus, which was the duty of the employee; in the latter, the argument concerned the raising and
lowering of gates over a railroad at a street crossing, also the
duty of the employee-whereas in the case at bar the argument
was over the collection of money, and the shooting did not
arise out of the bellboy's services.
It can be stated generally that a master may now be liable
for willful acts of his servant leading to assault and battery 14,
false imprisonment, 15 malicious prosecution, 16 defamation, 17
misrepresentation' 8, or conversion, 9 where the employment
is of a kind likely to lead to an opportunity or incentive to
commit such torts and the servant could have been motivated
or inspired to serve the master by such tortious acts.
It is proposed that such motive is at least dubious if not
ludicrous. The extent of scope of employment is unfortunately
outlined in rather shadowy boundaries and the courts have
allowed fiction to superimpose fiction. A willful tort should be
considered as an extraordinary act which is not the result of the
employment or presumed to be incited to benefit the master,
'3

Note 10, Supra at 986.

14 Prince v. Brichell, 87 Ga. App. 697, 75 S. E. 2d 288 (1953); Lipman v. Atlantic

Coast LineR. Co., 108 S. C. 151,93 S.E. 714 (1917).
15 Palmer v. Maine Central R.R.Co., 92 Me. 399,42 A. 800 (1899).
16 Manual v. Cassada, 190 Va. 906, 59 S.E.2d 47 (1950); Eastman v. Leiser Co.,
148 Minn. 96, 181 N.W. 109 (1921); Rest. 2d, Agency sec. 246, 253.
17 Slaughter v. Valleydae Packers, 198 Va. 339, 94 S.E. 2d 260 (1956); Rest 2d,
Agency sec. 247, 254; 35 Am. Jur. Master and Servant sec. 568.
18 Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 278 U. S. 349 (1929); Rest. 2d. Agency sec.
249, 257-64.
'9 Powell v. Brown Motor Co., 200 S.C. 75, 20 S.E. 2d 636 (1942); Wembach
Corp. v. Emigrant Savings Bank, 34 N. Y.S. 2d 688, 264 App. Div. 161,
affd. 289 N. Y. 662, 45 N.E. 2d 169 (1942); 35 Am. Jur. Master and
Servant sec. 571; Rest. 2d, Agency sec. 244.
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but a personal act arising out of wanton or other malicious
motives of a strictly private nature. The courts should thus
separate willful and unintentional torts and be more descriminating in making the employer respond.
In the Ochsridercase, the court, looking to the viciousness of
the assault, rightly held that Randazzo could only be acting
from personal motives. Whereas in the Tri-State case the
court felt that Mooney was furthering his employer's business
by arrogantly refusing to give defendant motorist the right
of way, and assaulting him.
Accepting the logic of the Tri-State case, must we assume that,
since bus drivers who attack motorists who are innocently and
temporarily obstructing rights of locomotion are engaged in
furthering the interests of employers, then employees who
go about beating up fellow employees because the work is
progressing too slowly to suit them are also acting to further
employers' benefits?
No doubt there is justification in holding the master
liable in cases where the servant is negligently selected or retained,20 the master's duties are dearly non-delegable,21 a
dangerous instrumentality is involved,22 or the master has
ratified the act. 2 3
In some cases the extension of the doctrine has been
inspired by the principle which allows recovery against the
master for the purely personal intentional torts of the agent if
the master is under a public or contractual duty to the plaintiff
which requires the latter's protection; this is based on the
Wright v. Wright, 229 N.E. 503, 50 S.E. 2d 540 (1948); Central of Georgia R.
Co. v. Hall, 124 Ga. 322, 52 S.E. 679 (1905); Rest. Agency, sec. 440.
21 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Steele, 179 Ky. 605, 201 S.W. 43 (1918); Ashby v.
Norfolk Southern R. Co., 172 N.C. 98,89 S.E. 1059 (1916); Linam v. Murphy,
360 Mo. 1160, 232 S.W. 2d 937 (1950).
22 Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N.E. 279, 13 L.R.A. 219, 26 Am.St.
Rep. 249 (1891); Southern R. Co. v. Chambers, 126 Ga. 404, 55 S.E. 37 (1906);
Dowler v. Johnson, 225 N.Y. 39, 121 N.E. 487, 3 A.L.R. 146 (1918); Novick
v. Gouldsberry, 173 F2d 496 (1949).
23 Virginia Elec. Co. v. Lenz, 158 Va. 732, 164 S.E. 572 (1932); Goodard v. Grand
Trunk R.R., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. Rep. 39 (1869); Lipman v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. C., 108 S.C. 151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917). 10 Am. Jur. 105, Carriers, sec.
20

1121 et seq.
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common law liability of carriers24 and innkeepers.2 5 These
cases may be explained on the assumption that a public utility,
or any association imbued with a certain muniment of public
respect and duty above the ordinary, may be subjected to a
higher standard of liability.
Applying our previous proposition, it is difficult to differentiate among servants and others when the tortious act is of such
a personal nature. It is admitted that, had the courts limited this
doctrine (viz. the unusual standard of liability placed on organizations which owe more extensive duties to the public) to its
common law boundaries, the results might not have been
as startling. The extension indicates another artificial development of the vicarious liability concept. The trend can as
easily be extended, perhaps unconsciously, to any master
who could expect a third party to rely on his agent.
M. D. A.
24

25

Dixon v. Hotel Tutweiler Operating Co., 214 Ala. 396, 108 So. 26 (1926); 28
Am.Jr. 575, Innkeepers sec. 53.
This doctrine has been expanded to include: Telegraph companies (Dunn
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907)), Saloons
(Johnson v. Monson, 183 Cal. 149, 190 p. 635 (1920)) and hospitals (Vannah
v. Hart Hospital, 228 Mass. 132, 117 N.E. 328 (1917)).
"The general proposition that a person shall be answerable for any injury which
arises in carrying into execution that which he has employed another to do
seems to be too large." More v. Sanborne, 2 Mich. 519, 59 Am. Dec. 209,
approved in Ducre v. Sparrow-Kroll Lumber Co., 168 Mich. 49, 133 N. W.
938; cf. 27 Mich. L. Rev. 229, 230 (1929); 40 A.L.R. 1212-19 (1926)).

